It’s plausible to think Russia is learning and stress-testing its forces in Ukraine the way a coach uses a scrimmage to prepare for a tournament. But “practice run” is only part of the story: Ukraine has been both a proving ground and a grinder that has exposed big Russian weaknesses (logistics, training, command) even as Moscow adapts and hardens parts of its force. Below I’ll explain why, compare which NATO forces are actually most ready right now, and outline realistic ways this could play out — with sources for the key factual claims. NATO Language Centre+4CNA+4T2COM G2+4
1) Why the “practice run” idea has merit
-
Fighting in Ukraine gives real combat experience that is very different from exercises: units learn about combined arms in contested airspace, long-range fires, drone swarms, logistics under fire, urban fighting, and electronic warfare. Russia has been explicitly adapting doctrine and training based on lessons from Ukraine. CNA+1
-
Combat experience shortens the learning curve: officers, NCOs, and crews who survive get tacit knowledge that simulators and exercises don’t provide. That’s why some Russian formations have become more competent over time even while the overall force has serious problems. Al Jazeera
But — and this is critical — being a “practice” environment is a double-edged sword for Russia: high combat exposure builds experience for some units, while huge losses, poor logistic networks, and uneven training degrade the army overall. Independent analysts show Russia both adapting and suffering catastrophic attrition. IISS+1
2) Which NATO countries have battle-hardened troops now?
There’s no single NATO army that is uniformly “battle-hardened” the way some Russian/Ukraine units are after years of fighting. Instead there are different kinds of readiness:
-
United States — largest expeditionary, with many combat-experienced units from Iraq/Afghanistan and Syria; high logistics and force projection capability (airlift, sealift, prepositioning) but political decisions and force allocation matter. (See NATO exercise deployments and US role in exercises.) NATO Shape+1
-
United Kingdom & France — expeditionary, well-trained professional forces with recent combat experience (various theaters) and rapid reaction tools, but much smaller in scale than Russia’s mobilized manpower. NATO
-
Poland, Baltic states, and other eastern Allies — maintain forward-deployed NATO battlegroups and have increased readiness and training; these are deterrent forces (multinational battlegroups) rather than armies sized for large offensive operations. NATO+1
-
NATO’s high-readiness formations (Enhanced Forward Presence battlegroups, NATO Response Force / Spearhead Force) are designed to be deployable quickly — NRF elements and Allied Reaction Force training show tens of thousands available in rotation, but political authorizations, logistics, and time to move heavy equipment remain limiting factors. NATO Language Centre+1
Bottom line: several NATO states have combat-experienced units and excellent logistics, but none can instantly replace years of attrition-forged experience in mass. Deployability and political will are often the bigger constraints than pure combat quality. NATO Shape+1
3) How Russia’s apparent lead could be only partial
-
Focused learning: Russia can iterate tactics (e.g., drone/loitering-munition integration, combined infantry + fires) rapidly in Ukraine and disseminate those lessons. That makes some Russian units more dangerous in particular mission sets. CNA+1
-
Attrition problem: heavy casualties and equipment losses create a churn of inexperienced conscripts and contractor units that offset competence gains. Russia’s modernization and adaptation don’t automatically scale across the entire force. IISS
-
Industrial limit: sustained modernization requires industrial output and logistics — sanctions, production bottlenecks, and loss rates matter. That constrains how fast battlefield lessons turn into broadly capable forces. CNA
4) Plausible ways this could play out (scenarios)
I’ll give three realistic scenarios (not predictions) showing different dynamics and risks.
A — Prolonged grinding + localized gains (most likely near term)
Russia continues to refine tactics, makes incremental territorial gains in limited sectors, and forces Ukraine into costly defensive battles. NATO continues to supply weapons, train troops, and reinforce eastern flank, but avoids direct confrontation. Result: Russia gains some advantages of a “practice run” while suffering heavy attrition. Institute for the Study of War+1
B — Escalation + wider NATO involvement (riskier, political threshold dependent)
If Russia tries a major offensive beyond Ukraine’s borders or attacks NATO territory more directly (or uses strategic strikes against infrastructure in neighboring states), NATO’s treaty obligations and prepositioned forces could trigger larger deployments. Political will, logistics, and mobilization speed will determine the outcome: NATO’s expeditionary and high-readiness forces could blunt aggression, but large conventional war in Europe would be costly and dangerous. NATO+1
C — Russian learning drives long-term military reform + frozen conflict
Russia institutionalizes lessons from Ukraine into doctrine and training, gradually improving some force elements. The conflict eventually settles into a frozen or negotiated state, leaving a more capable Russian military but still balanced by NATO’s technological/industrial advantages and collective deterrence. CNA+1
5) Where NATO’s strengths vs. Russian practice-run strengths lie
-
NATO strengths: logistics, force projection (especially US), integrated air/naval power, technological edge (sensors, precision), cohesive alliance structures (if political will holds). These are hard to replicate quickly by Russia. NATO Shape+1
-
Russian “practice” strengths: brutal real-world combat experience in specific mission sets, experimentation with massed fires/drone swarms, and willingness to accept very high casualties and material losses to grind down an opponent. T2COM G2+1
6) What to watch next (early indicators)
-
Signs Russia institutionalizing lessons into large scale training and procurement (doctrine papers, large exercises, new unit formations). CNA
-
NATO decisions to expand forward posture, speed up NRF activation, or increase heavy equipment prepositioning in Eastern Europe. NATO+1
-
Changes in the battlefield tempo or new Russian weapons/tactics being used at scale — those would indicate lessons are being fielded broadly. Institute for the Study of War
Final take
Thinking of Ukraine as a “practice run” captures an important truth: the Kremlin is learning from real combat, and that learning can produce dangerous, tactically competent units. But practice in war is costly and uneven — Russia’s gains in know-how are balanced by heavy losses, logistical strains, and industrial limits. NATO doesn’t have a single uniformly battle-hardened army to roll out, but it does possess collective military depth, deployment capability, and technological advantages that make a broad Russian knockout unlikely without major escalation. How the situation evolves depends heavily on politics, logistics, and whether either side can sustain losses and supplies over time. CNA+2IISS+2
No comments:
Post a Comment